

*John is a man of (good) vision: enrichment with evaluative meanings**

Takanobu Akiyama
University of Lancaster

1. Introduction

In human communication, the linguistic form of an utterance often provides the hearer with only very skeletal information, and thus the hearer requires pragmatic inferential processing for interpretation of assumptions that are communicated by the utterance. It is reasonable to state that this pragmatic inferential processing is crucially contingent on contexts. In general, however, the term *context* tends to be restricted either to the discourse or co-text or to the physical situation. Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995²), in order to avoid this ad hoc explanation of the context, defines it as a subset of the hearer's beliefs and assumptions about the world which interacts with newly received information.

This paper, taking these into account, attempts to provide an account of pragmatic enrichment with evaluative adjectival meanings which occurs in interpretation of *man of + N* construction (e.g. *John is a man of (good) vision*). Pragmatic enrichment (or simply 'enrichment') is a pragmatic inferential process of fleshing out the logical form of an utterance in order to recover the explicature of the utterance. Interpretation of phrases such as *a man of sense, taste, vision, property*, etc. consistently requires enrichment processing with evaluative adjectival meanings, but there has been no research into the mechanism under which this sort of enrichment processing occurs. This problem will be discussed in the framework of 'relevance theory' on the lines proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1995²); this theory appears to be well equipped to make headway in the murky area involving various pragmatic phenomena. Yet, our examination is also carried out on the basis of data retrieved from the British National Corpus (BNC), because an introspection-based analysis alone does not afford an opportunity to construct a truly convincing argument.

The discussion below is organised as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a preliminary discussion of certain indispensable pragmatic concepts relating to arguments in this paper and to the establishment of a consistent perspective for analysing the target construction. Here we will attempt to define the term 'context', because one may presume that enrichment processing with evaluative meanings in the target construction is independent of the context, if the term 'context' is merely confined to external (i.e. linguistic and physical) contexts. Section 3 presents a survey of the target construction on the basis of data retrieved from the British National Corpus (BNC). We will classify phrases that give rise to evaluative enrichment into two types. Section 4 discusses how enrichment processing in the *man of + N* construction is motivated by relevance theory and establishes a hypothesis which is concerned with what the hearer's evaluative viewpoint is based on. Section 5 concludes this paper with a brief summary.

2. Preliminary discussion

2.1. Explicature and implicature: two levels of communicated assumptions

Before embarking on an analysis of enrichment with evaluative adjectival meanings, it is necessary to make explicit certain basic concepts relating to pragmatic processing and to establish, as far as possible, a consistent perspective for analysing it.

Sperber and Wilson (1995²) and followers of their theory (e.g. Blakemore (1987, 1992, 1995)) sort hearers' assumptions regarding what is communicated by utterance into two levels, viz. explicature and implicature. Explicature is the first level of assumption in utterance interpretation, at which the hearer fleshes out the under-determined form produced by the speaker to a fully elaborated, and accordingly explicit propositional form. At this level of assumption, the hearer's inference is based on the original utterance form, and is usually recovered by three types of processing, viz. disambiguation, reference assignment, and enrichment. Implicature, on the other hand, is the second level of assumption communicated by the utterance, where the hearer's inference is not based upon the original utterance form but upon the explicature, and thus the implicature can be quite removed from the original utterance form. A distinction between explicature and implicature can be hence drawn in terms of whether the assumption is contingent on the original utterance form or not. To enhance our understanding of the distinction between these two communicated assumptions, we will examine a breakfast conversation, during a scene in which Philip (husband), Jane (wife), and David (their son) are eating slices of toast.

(1) Philip: David, another piece of this.

Jane: I think he's had enough.

(BNC: KCH 430)

In the conversation above, both explicature and implicature are requisite for the interpretation of each utterance. Let us suppose that Jane's interpretation of Phillip's first utterance is: 'David, you can have another piece of toast.' This assumption can be called explicature, because it is recovered in terms of the enrichment of 'you can have' and the reference assignment of the pronoun 'this' with 'toast', motivated by the under-determinacy of the original utterance. Moreover, Philip's interpretation of Jane's utterance could be that 'I think David has had enough toast already' (viz. explicature), and then 'If he eats any more he'll be sick. So don't give him the toast' (viz. implicature). In Jane's utterance, the foregoing three types of processing to recover the explicature can be found: the pronouns 'I' and 'he' refer to the speaker (i.e. Jane) and David, respectively (viz. reference assignment), the verb 'have had' is to be construed as 'have consumed', not 'have possessed' (viz. disambiguation), and some word meanings (i.e. *toast* and *already*) are added (viz. enrichment).

At issue here is what the recovery of these communicated assumptions is based on. Let us confine ourselves to discussing explicature for simplicity of exposition. We skate over implicature here.

2.2 Perspectives on 'context': external contexts

As we have seen in the conversation (1) above, the original utterance form often provides only a very skeletal clue as to the explicature to be recovered. It will thus be reasonable to state that the process of fleshing out the original utterance form into an explicature crucially hinges on contexts. In the conversation (1), for instance, we will have to make much more effort in recovering these explicatures if we do not know that this conversation occurs during a breakfast scene. Further, Philip's first utterance, i.e. 'David, another piece of this', could not be interpreted properly, unless we knew from the context that the participants of the conversation were eating toast. The explication of explicature therefore stands in need of a consistent perspective on the term 'context'.

'Context' has been a very widely used term in linguistics and, as a consequence, any account of its meaning will be required to specify exactly how it is being used. Yet, many of the previous analyses of the context, while aiming to reify this abstract term, have mainly directed attention to external contexts and several types of them have been put forward, e.g. linguistic context (co-text), physical context (setting), etc. The linguistic context (co-text) will be the most easily postulated as a definition of context. It refers to the sounds, words, phrases, and so on, which come immediately before and after a particular phrase or piece of text and help to explain its meaning. The major role of the linguistic context for interpretation of utterances will be concerned with *cohesion* (c.f. Verschueren (1999: 104)). In other words, hearers attempt to solve reference assignment, disambiguation, etc. by referring back to earlier discourse or projecting toward a future linguistic context in order to give coherence to utterance interpretation. In the conversation (1), for instance, interpretation of Jane's utterance 'I think he's had enough' will require as a linguistic context Philip's previous utterance 'David, another piece of this', to resolve a reference assignment of 'he' as 'David'. The physical context (setting) can be defined as 'the spatio-temporal location of the utterance, i.e. as the particular time (moment) and particular place at which speaker gives utterance and the particular time and place at which the hearer hears or reads the utterance' (Allan (1986: 36)). This type of context is, thus, in particular concerned with the reference assignment of deictic expressions of place (e.g. 'here', 'there') and of time (e.g. 'yesterday', 'last week'). Suppose that you are told by someone 'Sit here; but don't sit here, please'. You will be thrown into confusion by the indeterminacy of 'here' in this utterance unless the speaker designates two locations (e.g. two chairs) alternatively.

It is indubitable that utterance interpretation is very highly determined by contextual factors, but it will be inadequate to direct attention to only the linguistic and the physical contexts, say the external contexts. In the following utterances (2) and (3), the explicatures recovered by means of enrichment processing do not seem to be dependent on those external contexts.

(2) a. Whatever else the mysterious Arianna might be, *she was clearly a woman of taste.*¹

(BNC: JY7 4224)

b. = ..., she was clearly a woman of good/*bad taste.

(3) a. *Wordsworth was a man of feeling*, for an Englishman, but well compared to Oor Rabbie quite frankly he was nothing to write home about. (BNC: B38 112)

b. = Wordsworth was a man of strong/*weak feeling, ...

¹ Hereafter, italics in corpus sentences quoted from the BNC are inserted to highlight relevant parts of the example.

Application of those external (i.e. the linguistic and the physical) contexts to the explication of the enrichment in (2b) and (3b) will be both pointless and stultifying. In the next section, in order to avoid this impasse, we will turn attention to a ‘psychological construct’ as per Sperber and Wilson (1995²).

2.3. A psychological construct as a context

While the emphasis in the previous analyses of context has been placed mainly on the external contexts in which an utterance is made, Sperber and Wilson (1995²:15ff) lay stress on the (internal) psychological construct, viz. the subset of the hearer’s current knowledge, beliefs, assumptions, hypothesis, and cultural and social conventions about the world. Of interest here is that Sperber and Wilson do not categorise contexts into several types but unify them into a single one that is supposed to exist in our mind. In their view, understanding an utterance is a matter of integrating the proposition it expresses with a context of existing beliefs and assumptions.

The set of premises used in interpreting an utterance [...] constitutes what is generally known as the *context*. A context is a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the world. (Sperber and Wilson 1995²: 15)²

This will come close to saying that the ‘psychological construct’ here subsumes a notion ‘schema’ in cognitive psychology (cf. Blakemore 1992: 17; Sperber and Wilson 1995²:138). The schema is ‘a structured cluster of concepts; usually it involves generic knowledge and may be used to represent events, sequences of events, percepts, situations, relations, and even objects’ (Eysenck and Keane 2000⁴: 252). In what follows I will claim that the psychological construct of the schema goes hand in hand with the enrichment processing of the construction ‘*man of + noun*’ (see (2-3) above).

3. Enrichment in ‘*Man of + N (noun)*’

3.1. Classification of the target construction

First of all let us start our analyses of enrichment of the target construction by classifying this construction according to the meaning of nouns following the *man of*. Our examination in the following discussion is based on data from the BNC, because an introspection-based analysis alone does not afford an opportunity to construct a truly convincing argument. The BNC contains 2060 examples of a collocation *man of* in 970 different texts, and 260 types and 651 tokens extracted from these 2060 examples are ‘*man of + noun (N)*’. These 260 types of ‘*man of + N*’ fall roughly into the following three categories: (I) the N characterises the man’s activity or occupation (e.g. *a man of letters*); (II) the N denotes a group, nationality etc (e.g. *a man of French*); (III) the N denotes the man’s essential feature or his trait, which is based on his physical/psychological/social properties. (e.g. *a man of sense*; *a man of principles*)³

Category (I) includes as its member *a man of action, commerce, letters, business, law, peace*, etc. The nouns in this category characterise the man’s activity, which leads to his occupation. For instance, *a man of action* denotes a man whose whole life is a soldier, sportsman, political leader, etc.; *a man of peace* denotes a man whose life is to bring about peace; *a man of letters* denotes a man who writes works of literature or writes about literature. Category (II) has as members *a man of Europe, India, Borneo, China* etc. In what follows, these two categories will be excluded from our consideration.

Category (III), which is the object of our investigation, refers to a man’s physical/psychological/social characteristic or some essential feature of his character. Some nouns appearing in this category bring about enrichment with evaluative meanings for interpretation of the whole phrase (e.g. *a man of (good) sense*). In my investigation there are 41 phrases belonging to this category; the examples and their frequencies are described in Table 1. Here we should notice that not all the phrases in the category (III) undergo enrichment with evaluative meanings for the interpretation.

² Blakemore (1992: 87), following Sperber and Wilson, defines the term context as ‘the beliefs and assumptions the hearer constructs for the interpretation of an utterance either on the basis of her perceptual abilities or on the basis of the assumptions she has stored in memory or on the basis of her interpretation of previous utterances’.

³ There are a small number of phrases in which N refers to a man’s name (e.g. *a man of John*). Yet, for this very small number of members, I do not set up another category.

Table 1 Phrases and Frequencies of Category (III)

phrase	freq.	phrase	freq.
<i>man of honour</i>	19	<i>man of experience</i>	2
<i>man of integrity</i>	10	<i>man of principles</i>	2
<i>man of principle</i>	9	<i>man of quality</i>	2
<i>man of power</i>	8	<i>man of ability</i>	1
<i>man of reason</i>	8	<i>man of ambition</i>	1
<i>man of influence</i>	7	<i>man of anger</i>	1
<i>man of property</i>	7	<i>man of caution</i>	1
<i>man of vision</i>	5	<i>man of contradictions</i>	1
<i>man of courage</i>	4	<i>man of excitement</i>	1
<i>man of culture</i>	4	<i>man of family</i>	1
<i>man of genius</i>	4	<i>man of fidelity</i>	1
<i>man of knowledge</i>	4	<i>man of goodwill</i>	1
<i>man of sense</i>	4	<i>man of humour</i>	1
<i>man of taste</i>	4	<i>man of ideas</i>	1
<i>man of character</i>	3	<i>man of individuality</i>	1
<i>man of dignity</i>	3	<i>man of passions</i>	1
<i>man of feeling</i>	3	<i>man of spirit</i>	1
<i>man of learning</i>	3	<i>man of self-discipline</i>	1
<i>man of passion</i>	3	<i>man of strength</i>	1
<i>man of standing</i>	3	<i>man of surprise</i>	1
<i>man of energy</i>	2		

3.2. Analysis of ‘man of + N’

3.2.1. Phrases of truisms

Phrases which obviously yield enrichment with evaluative meanings are listed up in Table 2. These phrases are retrieved from Table 1. Most of the phrases refer to a man’s physical or psychological properties and others make reference to a man’s social properties. Phrases concerning a man’s physical or psychological properties are a *man of power*, *vision*, *knowledge*, *sense*, *taste*, *character*, *feeling*, *energy*, *experience*, *principles*, *ability*, *ideas*, *spirit*, and *strength*. Phrases in relation to a man’s social properties are a *man of property*, *culture*, *standing*, *quality*, and *family*.

Table 2 Phrases which Obviously Yield Enrichment with Evaluative Meanings for their Interpretation

phrase	freq.	phrase	freq.
<i>man of power</i>	8	<i>man of energy</i>	2
<i>man of property</i>	7	<i>man of experience</i>	2
<i>man of vision</i>	5	<i>man of principles</i>	2
<i>man of culture</i>	4	<i>man of quality</i>	2
<i>man of knowledge</i>	4	<i>man of ability</i>	1
<i>man of sense</i>	4	<i>man of family</i>	1
<i>man of taste</i>	4	<i>man of ideas</i>	1
<i>man of character</i>	3	<i>man of spirit</i>	1
<i>man of feeling</i>	3	<i>man of strength</i>	1
<i>man of standing</i>	3		

Phrases listed in Table 2 obviously give rise to evaluative enrichment for their interpretation. All Ns following *man of* in these phrases, which refer to human physical, psychological or social properties are considered as being the endowment of all humans ubiquitously. Another common denominator among these Ns is that in their lexical level they do not denote a specific (e.g. high or low; good or bad) degree. *Power*, for example, basically denotes a particular ability of the body or mind but does not specify its degree in its lexical level. Yet *power* denotes a high degree sense in the *man of + N* construction with

enrichment processing.

- (4) a. Pope Gregory the Great had spoken of taming the wild unicorn, symbol of the *man of power*. (BNC: HPT 616)
 b. = ..., symbol of the *man of great/*low power*.

Property, culture, standing, quality, and family are usually assumed to be possessed by humans in their social life. For instance, *a man of property*, in its linguistically decoded logical form without enrichment processing, denotes *a man who owns things*. This logical form itself does not carry any new information.

A close look at the data in table 2 reveals that Ns following the collocation *man of* commonly denote properties of human beings. Moreover I reiterate that these properties are assumed as ubiquitous among humans. It is of significance therefore that the phrases in Table 2 can result in a 'truism', if we do not interpret these phrases with enrichment processing. A 'truism' is a statement that is obviously true, in particular one that does not say anything important.

On the other hand, sentences such as *He is a man of anger, passion, excitement, goodwill, and surprise*, all of which also make reference to a man's psychological property, are not likely to give rise to enrichment with evaluative meanings. This is because these Ns following *man of* clearly contain a gradable adjectival feature inherent in their basic senses. *Anger*, for example, denotes a 'strong' feeling of resentment, and thus denotes a strong feeling of wanting to harm or criticise someone because they have done something unfair. Besides, *man of honour, integrity, courage, genius, dignity, caution, contradictions, fidelity, and self-discipline* do not need enrichment processing with evaluative meanings for their interpretation. This will be because properties depicted by these Ns following *man of* are considered as distinctive or unique rather than ubiquitous among humans.

- (5) a. "I am *a man of honour* as well as a royal emissary." (BNC: H9C 1638)
 b. It is "mental bombast" as opposed to verbal bombast, and it is a "fault of which none but *a man of genius* is capable". (BNC: CDL 1530)

3.2.2. Phrases of Vagueness

There are some more phrases that require enrichment processing with evaluative meanings for their interpretation in the *man of* + N construction: these are listed in Table 3. It will be normal and expected in our social life for humans to have properties described by Ns following *man of* in this table. However, we cannot say that every human being is assumed to possess these properties equally. Therefore linguistically decoded logical forms of these phrases do not obviously give rise to truism but rather vagueness of their meanings, if these phrases are interpreted without enrichment. Further it is not obvious but likely that enrichment processing with evaluative meaning for the phrase interpretation in Table 3 occurs. It follows from this that the possibility of occurrence of enrichment processing in the *man of* + N construction is a matter of degree.

Table 3. Phrases which are Likely to Yield Enrichment with Evaluative Meanings for their Interpretation

phrase	freq.
<i>man of reason</i>	8
<i>man of influence</i>	7
<i>man of learning</i>	3
<i>man of humour</i>	1
<i>man of individuality</i>	1

It will be admissible to state that the scales of properties described by Ns in these phrases are vague, and this vagueness provides a motivation for enrichment processing.

- (6) a. He was *a man of influence* in the literary world. (BNC: AC3 1486)
 b. = He was *a man of great/*small influence* in the literary world.
 (7) a. I'm *a man of individuality* where garden embellishment is concerned. (BNC: ACX 184)
 b. = I'm *a man of strong/*weak individuality*...

In (6a) the meaning of the logical form of *a man of influence* is vague. In other words, it is not obvious how much influence the man in question has in the literary world, if enrichment processing is not carried out. In (7a) *a man of individuality* in its logical form also denotes a vague sense, because the meaning of the lexical item *individuality*, i.e. the quality that makes someone different from all other people, does not

carry a specific sense in a degree.

I claim that a common motivation for enrichment shared by truism-types of phrases (e.g. *a man of taste*) and vagueness-types of phrases (e.g. *a man of influence*) is a lack of *relevance*, a technical notion about communication put forward by Sperber and Wilson (1995²), which will give a unitary account of mechanism of enrichment processing in *man of + N* construction. In the next section we will discuss the relationship between this notion and enrichment processing in the construction under discussion.

4. Relevance Theory Approach to Enrichment Processing in *Man of + N* Construction

As it has been established that the N which appears in phrases in Table 2 commonly has essential properties (e.g. *a man of taste*), it will be reasonable to state that these features of Ns provide a clue to the exploration of the process of enrichment in '*man of + N*' construction. When the noun denotes essential properties of human beings and is neutral as to quality/value in its basic sense, the construction '*man of + N*' will become a kind of truism. So information in the truism will not cause the hearer to add any new information, or strengthen his/her existing assumption, or change her/his mind. In this section, we will discuss mechanism of enrichment processing of the target construction in the framework of 'relevance theory' on the lines proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1995²).

4.1. Communicative Principle of Relevance

According to the relevance theory, 'every aspect of communication and cognition is governed by the search for relevance' (Wilson and Sperber 1998: 9). This theory assumes that human communication and cognition are relevance oriented; we pay attention to information that seems relevant to us. The technical notion 'relevance' is measured in terms of the relationship between 'contextual effects' and 'processing effort'. Contextual effects are a kind of added set of conclusions that newly received information gives rise to, by interacting with a context, in order for the information to be relevant to the hearer. There are three ways in which newly received information may interact with the context to give rise to a contextual effect: (i) it may combine inferentially with contextual assumptions to yield a contextual implication; (ii) it may strengthen an existing assumption; (iii) it may contradict and lead to the elimination of an existing assumption (see Blakemore (1992: 30), (1995: 445); Sperber and Wilson (1995²: 108ff); Wilson and Sperber (1998: 8)). Other things being equal, the more contextual effects there are, the greater the relevance of particular information. However, these contextual effects, say context-dependent benefits in communication, do not occur without any cost but require 'processing effort', and therefore 'An assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent that the effort required to achieve these positive cognitive effects is small' (Sperber and Wilson 1995²: 266). In other words, contextual effects need to be economically achieved, and thus the harder a hearer has to try to interpret the information, the less relevant it is. To summarise, a highly relevant utterance has large contextual effects for small processing effort, and an utterance of small relevance has a processing effort which exceeds its potential contextual effect.

Taking these notions into account, Sperber and Wilson (1995²) enunciate the following fundamental principle about human communication:

- (8) (Communicative) Principle of Relevance: every ostensive stimulus communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance. (Sperber and Wilson 1995²: 158)

This will come close to saying that every ostensive (i.e. deliberate and overt) communication involves a presumption that utterance will have adequate contextual effects for the minimum necessary processing.

Let us turn back to the discussion of our original problem. We have seen that the '*man of + N*' construction, several instances of which give rise to enrichment with evaluative meanings for their interpretation (e.g. *a man of taste*), would be understood as a truism, if the phrase were interpreted without the enrichment processing. (That is, every man can be assumed to have some kind of taste.) In this case, the processing effort for the truism-interpretation will be minimal because this interpretation is merely dependent on the hearer's lexical knowledge of the lexical items (i.e. *man*, *of*, and *taste*), but at the same time this truism-interpretation also yields a minimal contextual effect. There will be no relevance in this interpretation. Yet, in order to follow the communicative principle of relevance, the hearer tries to find enough contextual effects and adds some meaning (e.g. *good* in *a man of good taste*). In this case, the processing effort is likely to be small, but the contextual effect will be adequately large to avoid a truism and to characterise the man in some positive, informative way. The contextual effect in '*a man of good taste*' is applied to case (i), viz. 'it (i.e. newly received information) may combine inferentially with

contextual assumptions to yield new conclusions’.

Moreover, analogous comments hold in the case of *a man of influence*, which is a member of the category depicted in Table 3 above. The interpretation of this phrase, if it does not involve enrichment processing, will yield vagueness, or indeterminacy in the meaning of this phrase (some degree of influence, whether great or small). Indeterminacy of meaning motivates enrichment processing, and thus *a man of influence* will be enriched to *a man of considerable/great influence*. Since the linguistically decoded logical form *a man of influence* brings about vagueness rather than a truism, it yields a small contextual effect with minimal processing effort. However, the hearer tries to make explicit the meaning of this phrase in order to solve the vagueness of the logical form, and thus he/she enriches the phrase meaning. Let us here recapitulate the foregoing discussion of the two scales (i.e. contextual effect and processing effort) in relation to enrichment processing of the target construction in the form of an outline summary in Table 4.

Table 4. Two Scales Relating to Enrichment Processing in ‘*a man of taste/influence*’

Logical Form and Explicature	Contextual Effect	Processing Effort
<i>John is a man of taste</i> (as a logical form [i.e. truism])	minimal	minimal
<i>John is a man of great taste</i> (as an explicature)	(adequately) large	small
<i>John is a man of influence</i> (as a logical form [i.e. vagueness])	small	minimal
<i>John is a man of great influence</i> (as an explicature)	(adequately) large	small

What is common to both these phrases (i.e. *a man of taste* and *a man of influence*) for their interpretation is that enrichments are motivated by the lack of relevance of the linguistically decoded logical forms of their original utterances. Comparison of the contextual effects of the logical forms between *a man of taste* and *a man of influence* suggests that the lack of relevance is a matter of degree.

4.2. Advantage-disadvantage hypothesis

So far we have discussed how enrichment is processed in the ‘*man of* + N’ construction, but our discussion has not accounted for the fact that meanings added in explicature of this target construction tend to have positive evaluative meanings (e.g. *good* in *a man of good taste*). In order to shed light on this problem, I put forward the following hypothesis: an ‘advantage-disadvantage’ hypothesis.

- (9) *Advantage-disadvantage*: The hearer’s evaluative viewpoint is based on the ‘advantage-disadvantage’ that he/she conceives of in his/her knowledge or assumptions about the world (e.g. schemata).

‘Advantage-disadvantage’ refers to a human’s psychological response to situations in which things happen. Further, I claim that a hearer’s judgement of advantage/disadvantage is made in terms of a human’s schemata (or encyclopaedic knowledge) in his/her beliefs and assumptions about the world. We can apply the advantage-disadvantage hypothesis to the elucidation of enrichment processing in the ‘*man of* + N’ construction (e.g. *a man of (good) taste*). Possession of properties such as *taste*, *sense*, *influence*, *learning* will be advantageous for a human’s life and thus it will be evaluated as positive. It is for this reason that phrases such as *a man of taste* or *a man of influence* usually receive positive evaluative meanings for their explicatures.

In order to make the preceding hypothesis defensible, we must examine more examples.

- (10) a. This milk has a smell.
b. = This milk has a *good/bad smell.

The state in which milk has a smell is supposed to be abnormal and the milk in this abnormal state will be unhealthy (i.e. disadvantage). This inferential process on the basis of the advantage-disadvantage hypothesis gives rise to the additional sense of *bad*, i.e. a negative evaluative meaning, to the explicature presented in (10b). On this basis, the foregoing hypothesis seems to be on the right track.

5. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to elucidate the enrichment processing with evaluative meanings in the *man of* + N construction. Our corpus investigation of the target construction reveals that phrases which yield

enrichment with evaluative meanings can split into two types, viz. the truism type (e.g. *a man of taste*) and the vagueness type (e.g. *a man of influence*). The common motivation for enrichment between these two types is a lack of relevance. That is, the linguistically decoded logical forms of these types of phrases cannot bring about contextual effects, which should be large in context in order for the newly impinging information (i.e. utterance) to be relevant. In order to avoid the lack of relevance, or in other words, to follow the communicative principle of relevance, the hearer enriches the logical form to give rise to an appropriate contextual effect. Moreover, we found that enrichment of the *man of* + N construction tended to require positive evaluative meanings (e.g. *a man of good taste*). Consequently I put forward the advantage-disadvantage hypothesis for the explication of the hearer's evaluative viewpoint. One may claim that this hypothesis comes into conflict with the principle of relevance methodologically, because the principle of relevance is supposed to be a *unitary* principle which governs all human communication. However, the hypothesis I have provided is not a rule but a description of a tendency regarding the hearer's evaluative viewpoints. While the hearer's evaluative viewpoint tends to be based on normal states in his/her schemata, the choice of the normal state which is utilised for interpretation of an utterance is contingent on the hearer's contextual assumption at a given moment, in order to follow the principle of relevance.

The advantage-disadvantage hypothesis is likely to be applied to the explication of evaluative enrichment in other constructions or even in constructions in other languages. With regard to the possibility of generalisation of this hypothesis, however, we have to wait for further research.

*This is a revised version of Akiyama (2000: Unpublished paper).

References

- Akiyama, T. 2000 *Pragmatic enrichment in the man of + N construction*. Unpublished paper. University of Lancaster.
- Allan, Keith (1986) *Linguistic Meaning*, vol.1. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Blakemore, D. 1987 *Semantic constraints on relevance*. Oxford, Blackwell.
- Blakemore, D. 1992 *Understanding utterances: an introduction to pragmatics*. Oxford, Blackwell.
- Blakemore, D. 1995 Relevance Theory. In Verschueren, J., J. Östman, J. Blommaert (eds.) *Handbook of pragmatics, manual*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. p.p. 443-52.
- Eysenck, M. W., M. T. Keane 2000⁴ *Cognitive psychology: a student handbook*. Hillsdale, N. Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Sperber, D., D. Wilson 1995² *Relevance: communication and cognition*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Verschueren, Jef (1999) *Understanding Pragmatics*. London: Arnold
- Wilson, D., D. Sperber 1998 Pragmatics and Time. In Carston, R., S. Uchida (eds.) *Relevance theory: applications and implications*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 1-22